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58 PEOPLE V. GmETH [21 C.2d 
(Crim. No. 4443. In Bank. Oct. 8, 1942.J 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. LESLIE B. GIRETH, 
Appellant. 
[1] Homicide-Appea1~Review . ..,..,-In a prosecution for murder by 
defendant of his paramour, a judgment upon a plea of guilty 
imposing the death penalty was affirmed where it was sup-
ported by defendanes voluntary statement to the authorities 
shortly after his arrest and by his testimony before the grand 
jury, and where an alienist testified as to his sanity. 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239) 
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Alameda County. 
Lincoln S. Church, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment on plea of guilty 
affirmed. 
Leslie B. Gireth in pro. per., for Appellant. 
Earl Warren, Attorney General, and David K. Lener, Dep-
uty Attorney General, for Respondent. 
THE COURT . ..,....This is an automatic appeal from a judg" 
ment 'of conviction of first-degree murder imposing the death 
penalty on the defendarit. (See § 1239, Peri. Code.) 
[1] Examination of therecol'd discloses that on July 
16, 1942, the defendant, a married man, shot and killed a 
young woman whom he hi1dbeen meeting clandestinely. The 
victim was shot as she slept in a motor-court cabin shared 
with the defendl'!-nt i:tt Alameda County. Defendant left the 
scene of the homicide and by telephone notified the authori-
ties of the' crime. 'He was taken into cUstOdy shortly there-
after and freely a.dmitted the shooting. Accordingly, he was 
indicted for murder. At all times he has refused the assis-
tance ,of counseL Upon his arraignment he pleaded guilty. 
After hearing evidence addressed to the degree of 'the crime, 
[1] See 13 Cal.J'ur. 740. 
:HeX. Dig. Reference: [1] Homicide, § 249. 
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the court determined it to be of the first degree and imposed 
the death penalty. ' 
The voluntary statement of the defendant to the authori:' 
ties shortly after his arrest and his testimony before the 
grand jury when it was investigating the crime; support 'the 
judgment. An alienist testified as to defendant'ssaniiy., 
The judgment is affirmed. 
[So F. No. 16720. In Bank. Oct. 29, 1942.] 
ROBERT FUENTES, Respondent, v. LEE LING, Appellant. 
[1] Automobnes-Regulation-Pede~trian: Trafilc • ..-Inasmuch as 
, the Vehicle Code (§§ 458, 560-564) regulates pedestrian traffic 
to the exclusion of local ordinances, an ordinance purporting 
to regulate such traffic is invalid, and its violation does not 
constitute negligence per se. 
[2] Id.~Contributoi'y Negligence---Persons CrossingStreets-Be-
tween Crosswalks: Appeal-Conclusiveness of Findings-Per-
sons Crossing Streets.-V chicle Code,' § 562, does riot prohibit a 
pedestrian from. crossing a street outside of a crosswalk. And 
a, finding against contributory negligence will not be disturbed 
on appeal' where it appeared that a 'ped¢strian crossed a well 
lighted business street in the middle of 11. block, arid prO:-
ceeded on, his way after ha'ving' observed an au:tonlobile aP-
proaching from a distance of 200 feet,with nothing to obstruct 
his oi-the driver's view. 
[3] Id.-Appeal---'Conclusivenessof Findings-Negligence of De-
. fendant.-In an action for injuries sustained bya pedestrian 
struck by an automobile, a finding- ofnegligenCie of the dri'V'Ell' 
will not be disturbcdon appeal wher'c,although'h,cstop~~ 
his car within five feet after thc,eollislon, ,the ,trial com:f; 
might have concluded that he, Was negilgent in not' obserViD.g 
the pedestrian on a well lighted street. l' " ," 
[4] Id,-Contributory Neg1igence..-Pe~sons on, Foo~i:~toxicati~i. 
-Although a pedestrian struck by ,an automobile has taken 
" intoxicants, it does not necessarily follow'that his judg!iieili;<ar 
motor coordination is S,o affected as to make, him guiltY(;f 
contributory negligence. ' , ' " " " ; 
[1] See 2 Cal.Jur. Ten-year Supp. 29; 5 Am..Jur. 928. ,,',',', ,,',' 
McK. Dig. References: [1] AutOlDObill'l>, § 5; [2J Automobiles, 
§§ 129,371(4); [31 Automobiles, § 369(·1); [4] AutoIUobUes, § 125. 
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60 FUENTES 'V. LING [21 C.2d 
I. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. John J. Van Nostrand, 
Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages for injuries sustained by pedestrian 
struak by an automobile. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed. 
Snook & Snook & Chase and Snook & Chase for Appellant. 
Leon A. Blum for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-This action was brought by plaintiff to 
recover damages for personal injuries that he incurred when 
struck by an automobile operated by defendant. The accident 
occurred at about 7 o'clock on the evening of December 30, 
1938, on Third Street between 'Kirkwood and LaSalle A ve-
nues in San Francisco. Third Street, an arterial boulevard 
extending north and south, is a main highway between San 
Francisco and points south. It is. approximately eighty feet 
.wide and is marked by white lines dividing six lanes of traffic. 
Betw.een Kirkwood and. LaSalle Avenues, the frontage of 
Third Str.eet is occupied by stores, apartments, flats, and a 
'PUblic garage and constitutes a business district as that term 
is used in traffic laws. When the accident Occurred it was a 
clear night and the street was well lighted by street lights and 
Christmas light streamers strung throughout tIre block. Plain-
tiff, clad .in a dark suit, was crossing Third Street at right 
angles from east to west in the middle of the block when he was 
lnu:lckeddown by the automobile that defendant was driving 
south on the west side of Third Street in the second lane of 
traffic. ~here is no pedestrian crosswalk in the middle of the 
blOClr where plaintiff attempted to cross and where the acci-
dent· occurred. There are such crosswalks marked by white 
lines at' the intersections of Third Street. Plaintiff testified 
that he was more than halfway across the street when he first 
saw defendant's car approaching from a distance of approxi-
mately 200 feet, aI;ld that he thought that he could cross in 
safety before defendant's car travelod the distance of 200 
feet or reached the middle of the block, although the car was 
traveling at a "fast" spred. A traffic officer's report de-
. scribed plajntiff at the time of the accident as "under the 
influence of intoxicants," and hospital records described 
plaintiff as having a strong alcoholic breath, but plaintiff tes-
r). 
if , 
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tified that he was not drunk and had taken no intoxicants ·tfu ' 
the day of thf.' accident. Defendant and :h.isson,who wall 
riding- with him in the front seat, testified that they" did n.ot 
sce plaintiff before the impact although they were both'ob-
servin~ the highway. They, as well as :other occupants '9:f'th~ 
automobile, estimated its speed as betWeen'18 iind',20',riiiieh 
per hour. Witnesses for the plaintifftestiIledthAt itlieauto:tn9-
bile was traveling at a rate of 40 to 45 ,miles per: hour,. , D~­
fendant brought his car to an almost imin'edia:tfstop '~ftei­
the right front part of the car struck pl8intiff~,:Plainti~':~en 
to the pavement with his head near the west curb and his'feet 
under the running board of the car at about five feet norlh 
of the car's front bumper. There were no skid marks QD ih~ 
pavement. ' " : 
After a trial without a jury, the court made findingS' in 
favor of plaintiff and entered judgment for him .in the amount 
of $4,373 and costs. Defendant has appeBledfromthe judg. 
ment on the ground that plaintiff was guilty'of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law and that the evidence was ,in-
sufficient to support the findings and judgment. 
[1] The contention that plaintiff wasguiity of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law rests on' the Violation of se~. 
tion 10 of article 3 of Ordinance 7691, NeW-Series, of San 
Francisco, which provides:" When. within the' c'entral traffic 
district or a husiness district no pedestrian shall cross' a 
roadway other than by a crosswalk. "Phiintiff admittedly 
violated .the ordinance. It has recently been held, however, 
. that the Vehicle Code (§§ 458;. 560-564) . regulates the use 
of public roadways by pedestrians to the exclusion of local 
ordinances. (Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal.2d 366 [125 P.2d 482J. 
The San Francisco ordinance is indistinguishable from the Los 
Angeles ordinance held invalid in the Pipoly case. It follows 
therefore that plaintiff's violation of the ordinance did not con-
stitute cuntributory negligence per se. 
[2] Defendant contends that plaintiff's conduct was . also 
a violation of the Vehicle Code and therefore constituted con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law. Section 562 of the 
Vehicle Code provides: "( a) Every pedestrian crossing a 
roadway at any point other than within. a marked crosswalk 
or ,,-ithin an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield 
the right of way to all vehicles upon the roadway." It does 
not prohibit a pedestrian from crossing outside of a crosswalk, 
however. (Genola v. Barnett, 14 Cal.~d 217 [93 P.2d 109].) 
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62 FUENTES v. LING [21 C.2d 
Moreover the statute provides that "The prOVISIOns of this 
section shall not relieve the driver of a vehicle from the duty 
to exercise due care for the safety of any pedestrian upon a 
roadway. " It cannot be said that as a matter of law a pedes-
trian who crosses a well lighted business street in the middle 
of a block is guilty of violating the statute or of negligence 
proximately contributing to his injury when he proceeds on 
his way after having observed an automobile approaching 
from a distance of 200 feet, with nothing to obstruct his view 
or that of the driver. (See Quinn v. Rosenfeld, 15 Ca1.2d 486 
[102 P.2d 317]; Genola v. Barnett, supra; Mitrovitch v. 
Graves, 25 Cal.App.2d 649 [78 P.2d227] ; Varner v. Skov, 
20 Cal.App.2d 232 [67 P.2d 123]; White v. Davis, 103 
Cal.App. 531 [284 P. 1086].) Section 563 of the Vehicle 
Code prohibits pedestrians from crossing except in a cross-
walk between adjacent intersections where traffic is controlled 
by a traffic control signal device or by police officers. There 
is no evidence, nor is it contended that the traffic was so con-
trolled at the intersections of Third Street and Kirkwood or 
LaSalle Avenues. 
The questions of negligence and contributory negligence 
were for the trial court to determine (Quinn v. Rosenfeld, 
supra; Genola v. Barnett, supra; Mitrovit,:h v. Graves, supra; 
White v. Davis, supra), and its findings when supported by 
the evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. [3] The evi-
dence as to the negligence of defendant was conflicting. The 
ability of defendant to stop his automobile within five feet 
after the collision suggests the improbability of excessive 
speed, but even if the court accepted the defendant's version 
in that regard it might have concluded that defendant was 
negligent in not observing plaintiff on a well lighted street. 
[4] The evidence as to plaintiff's intoxication was also con-
flicting, but even if the court believed that plaintiff had taken 
intoxicants it does not necessarily follow that his judgment 
or motor coordination were so affected as to make him guilty 
of contributory negligence. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., 
and Schauer, J. pro tem., concurred. 
Oct. 1942] JOHNSTON v. LANDUOOI G3 
[L. A. No. 17749. In Bank. Oct. 29, 1942.] 
E. E. JOHNSTON et al., Appellants, v. OLIVE LANDUCCI, 
Respondent. 
[1] Vendor and Purchaser - Assignment - Rights Between .Pur-
chaser and Assignee - Prohibition of Assignment Without 
Consent.-In a contract for the sale of real property a prohibi-
tionof an assignment of the rights of the vendee without the 
consent of the vendor is for the benefit of the vendor only and 
in no way affects the validity of an assignment without consent 
as between the assignor and the assignee. 
[2] Id.-Assignment--"Subject to Approval" of. Vendor-Con-
struction.-Where a contract for the sale of real property 
provides that an assignment thereof is "subject to the ap-
proval" of the vendor and also prohibits an assignment by 
the vendee without the consent of the vendor, the words 
"subject to the approval" are intended to. refer back to· the 
provision against assignment and to call the· assignee's atten-
tion to the possible refusal of consent. Under this interpreta-
tion the "subject to approval" clause has the sameJegal effect 
as the provision against assignment. 
[3] Contracts'-Interpretation-Functions of Courts.-Where the 
construction given an instrument by the trial court appears 
to be consistent with the true intent of the parties· as shown 
by the evidence, another interpretation will not he substituted 
on appeal although such other interpretation might, witb,out 
consideration of the evidence, seem equally tenable. 
[4] Vendor and Purchaser-Assignment--Construction.-Although 
a contract of sale of land prohibited an assignment without the 
vendor's consent, and the vendee, without such consent, executed 
an assignment "subject to the approval" of the vendor, a con-
struction of the assignment as valid as between the vendee and 
his assignee was consistent with their intent, where. the lawyer 
preparing it testified that nothing was saini by either party 
about sccuring the vendor's consent, where the assignor did not 
agree to obtain the vendor's approval, and where immediately 
upon the completion of the deal the assig~ee delivered to the 
assignor his note and an assignment. of his interest in other 
lands, and subsequently both parties treated the assignment 
as a completed transaction. 
[1] See 27 R.C.L. 564. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Vendor and Purchaser, §:218; [2,4] 
Vendor and Purchaser, § 215; [3] Contracts, § 161; .[5J Contracts, 
§ 150. 
